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Internet Privacy Enforcement After
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Thomas B. Norton*
In March 2015, the Federal Communications Commission reclassified broadband Internet access service providers as “common carriers”
subject to obligations under Title II of the Communications Act. One
such obligation is to comply with the Act’s section 222 privacy provisions. As a result of reclassification, the Federal Communications
Commission claims privacy enforcement jurisdiction over a broad swath
of companies that formerly fell within the Federal Trade Commission’s
regulatory reach. The Federal Trade Commission and industry players
have been outwardly critical of this effect. This Note explores the resulting tension between the two agencies and proposes potential resolutions
for it.
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INTRODUCTION: THE FCC’S OPEN INTERNET ORDER HAS
CAUSED INTERAGENCY TENSION OVER INTERNET PRIVACY
ENFORCEMENT
In March 2015, the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) released its Open Internet Order (the “Order”), which
established new net neutrality rules applicable to broadband Internet access service providers.1 These rules, which will apply to both
fixed and mobile broadband providers, have multiple effects.
Among others, the rules prohibit blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization of broadband Internet services.2 The rules also require
heightened transparency from broadband service providers and
dictate their future conduct.3 But most significantly for this Note,
the rules reclassify broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications
Act.4
In the Order, the FCC elected to forbear from applying some
provisions of Title II to newly reclassified broadband Internet services providers.5 But with respect to certain of the Title’s other
provisions, the FCC elected not to forbear application. One of these
provisions is section 222 of Title II of the Communications Act,
which governs the privacy of data known as Customer Proprietary
Network Information (“CPNI”).6 The FCC’s election to not forbear from applying this section means that newly reclassified
broadband Internet service providers are subject to the same privacy obligations as those imposed upon telephone service providers.7
By extending section 222 to cover broadband Internet service providers this way, the FCC’s rule supplants the Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) authority to regulate those companies,

1

See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet
Order].
2
See id. paras. 110–32.
3
See id. para. 109.
4
See id. paras. 306–87.
5
See id. paras. 434–60.
6
See id. paras. 462–67; see also infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
7
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462.
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because the FTC lacks jurisdiction over telecommunications service providers.8
Because of this, some FTC representatives have spoken out in
opposition of reclassification.9 Other privacy advocates, on the
other hand, view reclassification and section 222 forbearance as a
victory for consumer privacy.10 Nevertheless, the FCC’s action has
created an interagency tension that raises many interesting questions. First, what does the Order say about privacy, and how does
this alter the FCC and FTC’s respective privacy enforcement authority? What effect do the Order’s mandates have on the FTC
and FCC’s ability to adequately address those privacy concerns
that each is charged with policing? What explains the perceived
interagency tension to which the FCC’s action gives rise? And finally, what might be done to resolve that tension? I address these
questions in the remainder of this Note.
I proceed in four Parts. In Part I, I recount the pre-Open Internet Order online privacy landscape. I will describe both the FTC
and FCC’s privacy enforcement authority and summarize recent
privacy enforcement actions taken by each agency.
In Part II, I discuss the Order’s approach for regulating online
privacy. I will note the ways in which the Order addresses or fails to
address a shifting online privacy enforcement regime.
In Part III, I outline how the Order’s language drastically alters
the online privacy landscape. First, I describe how the FCC’s election to not forbear from applying section 222 privacy obligations to
broadband Internet service providers dramatically expands those
providers’ privacy obligations. I also explain how these broad new
obligations expose those providers to increased risk of enforcement. Finally, I devote substantial discussion to jurisdictional challenges that result from reclassification. This discussion focuses
mainly on the FTC’s discontent with the effect of reclassification
of broadband Internet service providers as Title II “common carri8

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2) (2012). Because broadband Internet services have
hitherto not been offered on a common carrier basis, the FTC has exercised jurisdiction
over those services. Id.; see also FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58–60 (2d Cir.
2006).
9
See infra Part III.C.2.
10
See infra Part III.C.2.
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ers” on its privacy enforcement authority, as well as on possible
explanations for this response.
In Part IV, I analyze possibilities for resolving the jurisdictional
challenges that reclassification raises. These possibilities include
the FCC’s promulgating FTC-like privacy rules, Congress’ repealing the Federal Trade Act’s common carrier exception, and an
FCC/FTC co-governance regime.
I. THE PRE-OPEN INTERNET ORDER PRIVACY
ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE
As consumers grow more interested in the privacy of their personal information, so grow efforts to regulate privacy online. While
many are familiar with the FTC’s role as a privacy and security enforcer, the FCC very recently adopted an aggressive approach to
broadening its authority to enforce privacy against the entities it
regulates. In this Part, I frame both agencies’ authority and approach to privacy enforcement.
A. FTC Privacy Enforcement
The FTC is the agency charged with protecting consumers and
their privacy.11 As part of its privacy efforts, the FCC conducts
studies and issues reports, hosts public workshops, develops educational materials for both consumers and industry, and influences
privacy-related legislation and regulation.12 The FTC has authority
to enforce a variety of sectoral privacy laws, such as the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) and the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (“GLB”).13 In addition, the FTC offers an “en11

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE 1 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9FF-UV99] [hereinafter
2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE].
12
See id.
13
Id. COPPA requires websites and apps to obtain parental consent before collecting
personal information from users who are under the age of thirteen. See Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2000). The FTC has brought
over twenty COPPA cases and has revised the COPPA rule to meet developments in
social networking, Internet access on smartphones, and geolocation tracking that
implicate children’s privacy. 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7.
The GLB Act requires financial institutions to send consumers annual privacy notices and
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forcement backstop” for the Safe Harbor Agreement through
which United States companies transfer customer data to and from
the European Union in a manner consistent with European Union
law.14
But recently, the primary thrust of the FTC’s consumer protection authority has come from section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits unfair or deceptive market practices.15 Through investigation and subsequent enforcement action, the FTC addresses consumer protection violations by ordering companies to remedy unlawful behavior.16 Such
orders typically require that malfeasant companies take specific
remedial steps, including that they implement comprehensive privacy and data security programs, delete unlawfully-obtained consumer information, provide adequate notice and choice about privacy practices, and other measures.17 The FTC has brought enforcement actions against, and has entered into settlements with,
many companies, including well-known companies such as Google,
Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft.18
provide the opportunity to opt out of having their information shared with certain third
parties. Id. The FTC has brought nearly thirty cases against GLB Act violators, including
three in 2014. See id. at 6.
14
See 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11, at 6–7. On October 6, 2015,
the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the safe harbor framework invalid as
a means to legitimize transfers of personal data between the EU and the United States.
See Case C-362-14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169195&doclang=en
[http://perma.cc/JAJ8-K5XC].
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (declaring unfair methods of competition unlawful and
delineating means for preventing them). In August 2015, the FTC issued a Statement of
Enforcement Principles that “describes the underlying antitrust principles that guide the
[FTC’s] application of its statutory authority to take action against unfair methods of
competition prohibited by [s]ection 5 of the FTC Act.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues
Statement of Principles Regarding Enforcement of FTC Act as a Competition Statute, FTC
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/ftc-issuesstatement-principles-regarding-enforcement-ftc-act [https://perma.cc/4BUS-TGQV];
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair
Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, FTC (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section
5enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5CV-24HS].
16
See 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11.
17
Id.
18
See id.
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Several recent enforcement actions exemplify the FTC’s enforcement approach. In one, the FTC charged a company called
Jerk, LLC (operating under the domain Jerk.com) for perpetuating
an extortionary scheme that involved harvesting information from
individuals’ Facebook profiles to fabricate false profiles labeling the
individuals either as a “Jerk” or “not a Jerk.”19 After it created a
profile, Jerk.com would then contact those individuals whose information appeared in the profile to advise them that they could
revise those profiles by paying the company thirty dollars in
“membership” fees.20 The FTC’s complaint alleged that Jerk.com
misled its victims by claiming that the profiles had been created by
other Jerk.com members and that by paying for a site membership
they would have access to “premium” features.21 On March 25,
2015, the FTC announced that in a five-to-zero vote, it granted
summary decision against Jerk.com for these misleading practices.22
In In re Snapchat, Inc., another recent enforcement action, the
photo-sharing app settled charges that it deceived consumers by
promising that “snaps”—photos taken by one user and sent to
another—would “disappear[ ] forever” after a sender-specified
time period expired.23 The FTC intervened because, in reality,
photo recipients could save snaps indefinitely using relatively simple methods (such as by taking screenshots or installing third-party
apps).24 Here, the FTC again voted five-to-zero to settle its charges
19

Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Operators of “Jerk.com” Website With Deceiving
Consumers, FTC (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/
04/ftc-charges-operators-jerkcom-website-deceiving-consumers
[https://perma.cc/939G-SZ6P]. See generally Complaint, In re Jerk, LLC, No. 122 3141
(F.T.C. Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140407jerk
part3cmpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/RGT8-WAEM] [hereinafter Jerk Complaint].
20
See Jerk Complaint, supra note 19, at 2.
21
See id. at 5–6.
22
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Rules Jerk, LLC and John Fanning Deceived Consumers,
Violated FTC Act, FTC (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/03/ftc-rules-jerk-llc-john-fanning-deceived-consumers-violated-ftc
[https://perma.cc/7XMB-M7EF].
23
Complaint at 1, 2–4, In re Snapchat, Inc., No. 132 3078 (F.T.C. Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NM49-GQ64].
24
See id. at 3–4.
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against Snapchat.25 The FTC noted that the settlement marked
another example of the agency’s “ongoing effort to ensure that
companies market their apps truthfully and keep their privacy
promises to consumers.”26
These are just a few examples—the FTC has brought over 115
privacy and security-related enforcement actions over the past fifteen years.27 The FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is so robust that
some contend that it amounts to the functional equivalent of a
“common law of privacy.”28 Though there exists “hardly any judicial opinions to show for it” (as most of the enforcement actions
end in settlement), privacy law professionals and lawyers facing
privacy issues “parse and analyze the FTC’s settlement agreements, reports, and activities as if they were pronouncements by
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.”29 Accordingly, the FTC’s
privacy-related activity is said to be “the broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United
States.”30
But the FTC is not the lone privacy sheriff. The FCC has the
authority to enforce privacy violations against entities falling within
its regulatory domain.
B. FCC Privacy Enforcement
Like the FTC, the FCC protects consumers’ privacy enforcement. The FCC’s privacy enforcement authority comes from section 222 of the Communications Act,31 which requires that telecommunications carriers “protect the confidentiality of [custom25
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against Snapchat,
FTC (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftcapproves-final-order-settling-charges-against-snapchat
[https://perma.cc/DTB6AWAK].
26
Id.
27
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and
Choice Framework, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y (2014), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
students/groups/is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Notice-and-Choice-01-12-2015-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/6YDC-LZZT].
28
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2014).
29
Id. at 585.
30
Id. at 587.
31
47 U.S.C. § 222 (2008).
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ers’] proprietary information” and ensure that it is not disclosed to
third parties without consumers’ consent.32 The Communications
Act defines “customer proprietary network information”
(“CPNI”) as that information related to customers’ use of a telecommunications service and the customers’ billing information as
it relates to that service.33 CPNI includes details about customers’
calls, including duration, frequency, time, and number dialed.34 It
does not include “subscriber list information” such as name, address, and phone number.35
The core privacy requirement for telecommunications carriers
is contained in section 222(c), which sets forth the confidentiality
protections that apply to CPNI.36 Per this provision, a carrier may
only use, disclose, or permit access to customers’ individually identifiable CPNI in limited circumstances: (1) as required by law; (2)
with the customer’s approval; or (3) as part of its provision of the
telecommunications service from which such information is derived, or as part of services necessary to or used in the provision of
such telecommunications service.37 Exceptions to the confidentiali32

See id. § 222(a).
See id. § 222(h)(1) (defining “customer proprietary network information” as “(A)
information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination,
location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any
customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the
customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information
contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service
received by a customer of a carrier”).
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id. § 222(c)(1) (“Except as required by law or with the approval of the customer,
a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network
information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use,
disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network
information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications service from which such
information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such
telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories.”). Section 222(a)
imposes a general duty on telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of
proprietary information relating to other carriers, equipment manufacturers, and
customers. See id. § 222(a). Section 222(b) provides that a carrier receiving or obtaining
proprietary information from other carriers for the purpose of providing a
telecommunications service is restricted to use such information only for that purpose;
the provision further provides that a carrier may not use that information for its own
marketing efforts. See id. § 222(b).
37
See id. § 222(c).
33
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ty provisions permit carriers to use, disclose, or permit access to
customer proprietary network information in other limited circumstances, including: (1) to initiate, provide, bill for, and collect
payment for telecommunications services; (2) to protect the rights
or property of the carrier, its customers, and other carriers from
improper use of those services; (3) to provide inbound telemarketing, referral, or administrative services to customers; and (4) to
provide a customer’s call location information in cases of emergency.38
In October 2014, the FCC took a “significant step”39 toward
protecting the privacy of information that falls beyond the traditional scope of CPNI.40 In In re TerraCom, Inc., the FCC held that
the Communications Act’s privacy protections extend to “all types
of information that should not be exposed widely to the public,
whether because that information is sensitive for economic reasons
or for reasons of personal privacy.”41 Though the FCC did not precisely define those data types included within the scope of “personal privacy” protection, it found “informative” the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) definition of
“personally identifiable information.”42
38

See id. § 222(d).
Alex Stout, FCC Imposes Record Penalty for Data Breach, LATHAM & WATKINS:
GLOBAL PRIVACY & SEC. COMPLIANCE L. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.globalprivacy
blog.com/privacy/fcc-imposes-record-penalty-for-data-breach/ [http://perma.cc/F4797CEM].
40
See generally In re TerraCom, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29
FCC Rcd. 13325 (2014) [hereinafter TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture] (determining that TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc. have apparently
willfully and repeatedly violated sections 222(a) and 201(b) of the Communications Act
of 1934).
41
Id. para. 14.
42
See id. para. 17. NIST defines “personally identifiable information” as:
[A]ny information about an individual maintained by an agency,
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace
an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and
(2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual,
such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-1 (2010),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T5RS-YN3X] (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO39
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In the case, TerraCom and YourTel—companies that offered
telephone services to low-income Americans through the FCC’s
Lifeline program43—faced investigation for their treatment of personal information that they collected from individuals to determine
those individuals’ eligibility to participate in the Lifeline program.44 Discovery revealed that the companies left collected information, which included Social Security numbers and evidence
of participation in other government assistance programs, unencrypted in the form of readable text accessible on the Internet.45
This prompted the FCC’s investigation.
In finding culpability, the FCC first noted that regulated entities have a duty to protect their customers’ general “proprietary
information”—not only their specific CPNI information.46 The
FCC determined that TerraCom and YourTel had breached that
duty.47 In addition to relying on section 222, the FCC cited section
201(b)’s requirement that regulated entities engage in “just and
reasonable” conduct and determined that TerraCom and YourTel’s failure to use “even the most basic and readily available
technologies and security features,” and the companies’ failure to
notify affected customers that their data had been breached, were
neither just nor unreasonable.48
08-0536, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR ENHANCING PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08536.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8UQL-PKUM]).
43
The Lifeline program is a “retail voice telephony service that telecommunications
carriers provide to qualifying low-income consumers for a reduced charge.” TerraCom
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, at 1 n.1 (citing 47 C.F.R.
§ 54.407(b) (2015)); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.400–.422; Lifeline and Link Up Reform and
Modernization, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 6656, paras. 11–18 (2012).
44
See TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, para. 2.
45
See id. paras. 4–5.
46
See id. para. 14–15 (noting that “[s]ection 222(a) of the Communications Act
imposes a duty on every telecommunications carrier to protect the confidentiality of
[customers’] ‘proprietary information,’” that “Congress used the term ‘proprietary
information’ broadly to encompass all types of information that should not be exposed
widely to the public,” and that “[h]ad Congress wanted to limit the protections of
subsection (a) to CPNI, it could have done so”).
47
See id. para. 30 (explaining that the companies’ failure to “employ[ ] appropriate
security measures” to protect their customers’ information amounted to a breach of the
duty imposed by section 222(a)).
48
See id. para. 12.
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By a three-to-two vote, the FCC fined the two companies $10
million.49 The case marks the first time that the agency wielded its
enforcement authority to police data security practices, and according to Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc, it “will not be
the last.”50
The FCC followed the aggressive approach it took in TerraCom
when it took enforcement action against AT&T. In In re AT&T
Services, Inc.,51 the FCC investigated whether the company failed to
properly protect customers’ confidential information.52 In that
case, third-party vendors in Mexico, Colombia, and the Philippines
handled customer service calls.53 The third-party representatives in
these locations had access to customers’ sensitive personal information, including names and at least the last four digits of Social
Security numbers.54
Third-party representatives in Mexico used their login credentials to access the customer information.55 The representatives
then used the accessed customer data to unlock stolen AT&T
handsets via online request forms.56 In total, the Mexican employees made more than 290,000 unlock requests using data from
more than 50,000 customers.57 Similarly, representatives in Colombia and the Philippines accessed the data of approximately
211,000 customers.58

49

See id. para. 55; see also Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FCC Plans $10 Million Fine for
Carriers that Breached Consumer Privacy, FCC (Oct. 24, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-330136A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN54-ASPD].
50
See Brian Fung, With a $10 Million Fine, the FCC Is Leaping into Data Security for the
First Time, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/10/24/with-a-10-million-fine-the-fcc-is-leaping-into-data-security-forthe-first-time/ [http://perma.cc/5GWF-32H2].
51
In re AT&T Servs., Inc., Order and Consent Decree, 30 FCC Rcd. 2808 (2015)
[hereinafter AT&T Order and Consent Decree].
52
See id. para. 1.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See id. para. 7.
56
See id.
57
See id. para. 8.
58
See id. para. 11.
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As in TerraCom, no CPNI was compromised in the AT&T incident.59 But here again, the FCC based its investigation and enforcement action on the disclosure of “personal information.”60
AT&T consented to pay a record $25 million civil penalty and
agreed to implement mandatory privacy-related compliance and
monitoring procedures.61
TerraCom and AT&T represent an FCC trend to take enforcement actions to protect consumers’ privacy and data security. In
total, the FCC has taken five such major enforcement actions and
imposed fines valued at over $50 million in the past year.62 In May
2014, the FCC announced that it planned to fine Dialing Savings,
LLC $2.9 million for violating rules that protect consumers from
receiving harassing, intrusive, or unwanted robo-calls on their mobile devices.63 In the same month, the FCC entered into a $7.5 million settlement agreement with Sprint to resolve an investigation
into the company’s failure to honor consumers’ do-not call or donot-text requests.64 And in September 2014, the FCC reached a
$7.4 million settlement agreement with Verizon to address allegations that the company marketed to two million customers without
receiving their consent or notifying them of their privacy rights.65
In these recent enforcement actions, the FCC has carved out
for itself a major consumer protection role by policing privacy violations. Though the FTC is the agency that usually comes to mind
when one thinks of privacy and data security enforcement, the
FCC’s recent enforcement actions demonstrate the agency’s willingness to scrutinize the privacy and security practices of compa59

See id. paras. 8, 11.
Id. paras. 1–2.
61
See id. para. 24.
62
See Fed. Comm. Comm’n, AT&T to Pay $25 Million to Settle Consumer Privacy
Investigation: FCC’s Largest Data Security Enforcement Action, FCC (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332911A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q489-PLWW].
63
See In re Dialing Services, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC
Rcd. 5537 (2014).
64
See In re Sprint Corporation f/k/a Spring Nextel Corporation, Order, 29 FCC Rcd.
4759 (2014).
65
See In re Verizon Compliance with the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
Governing Customer Proprietary Network Information, Adopting Order, 29 FCC Rcd.
10303 (2014).
60
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nies that fall within its jurisdiction. Though telecommunications
companies are “accustomed to the high standards required for protecting CPNI,” the FCC’s aggressive approach in recent privacy
and security enforcement decisions may have a transformative effect on all regulated entities, including the recently reclassified
broadband Internet access service providers.66
II. THE FCC’S POST-NET NEUTRALITY APPROACH TO
INTERNET PRIVACY
The FCC in its Open Internet Order continues this aggressive
approach and as a result drastically alters the online privacy enforcement landscape. This Part dissects the Order’s language addressing privacy, analyzes what the order neglects to say about privacy, and details these statements and omissions’ overall effect on
the Internet privacy enforcement landscape.
A. How Does the Order Address Privacy Enforcement?
In the Order, the FCC elects to not forbear from applying section 222’s privacy protections to newly reclassified broadband Internet access service providers.67 There, the FCC remarks that it
“take[s] . . . seriously” section 222’s mandate that every telecommunications carrier protect the confidentiality of its customers’
private information.68 The FCC points out that it “has long supported protecting the privacy of users of advanced services.”69 In a
footnote, the Order notes that even “long before Congress enacted
section 222,” the FCC “recognized the need for privacy requirements associated with the provision of advanced services” and had
accordingly adopted appropriate privacy requirements.70 Against

66

See, e.g., Stout, supra note 39 (describing implications of an aggressive FCC privacy
and security enforcement policy).
67
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462.
68
Id. para. 462 n.1381.
69
Id. para. 463.
70
Id. para. 463 n.1384 (quoting In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, para. 149 & n.447 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband Classification Order]).
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this background, the Order asserts that retaining section 222 “thus
is consistent with the [FCC’s] general policy approach.”71
Additionally, the FCC justifies its decision to not forbear from
applying section 222 on the ground that forbearance would “not
[be] in the public interest,” as section 222 is “necessary for the
protection of consumers.”72 The FCC emphasizes that
“[c]onsumers’ privacy needs are no less important when consumers communicate over and use broadband Internet access than
when they rely on [telephone] services.”73 The FCC explains that
because consumers rely on their broadband service providers as
conduits for information exchange on the Internet, those providers
are poised to obtain “vast amounts” of customers’ private information.74 Without appropriate safeguards, the FCC argues, broadband providers could use or disclose such information in manners
“at odds with . . . customers’ interests.”75
According to the FCC, a lack of adequate privacy protections
might cause consumers to be concerned about how broadband providers treat their private information.76 This concern, the FCC believes, would result in consumers’ refraining from making full use
of broadband Internet access, which in turn would lower both demand for and adoption of broadband services.77 Adequate privacy
protections for customers’ personal information, on the other
hand, would spur demand for services and encourage broadband
investment and deployment consistent with the FCC’s goals.78

71

Id. para. 463.
Id. In these statements, the FCC references Communication Act section 10, which
requires the agency to “forbear from applying any regulation or provision of the
Communications Act to telecommunications carriers or . . . services if the [FCC]
determines that [certain conditions are met].” See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012).
73
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 463 (citing Wireline Broadband
Classification Order, supra note 70, para. 148).
74
See id.
75
Id.
76
See id. para. 464.
77
Id.
78
Id. (quoting In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927, para. 59 (2007)).
72
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Before issuing the final Order, the FCC received and considered comments that opposed the application of section 222 to
broadband Internet access service providers. In the Order, the
FCC rejects these comments as being too general and lacking any
“meaningful analysis” of how commenters’ concerns over application of the section outweigh the FCC’s privacy concerns.79 Accordingly, the FCC concludes that applying section 222 is in the public interest.80 In similar fashion, the FCC rejects arguments that the
Communications Act’s section 706—which requires the FCC to
determine whether “advanced telecommunications capability . . . is
being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion”81—provides adequate privacy protections to warrant section 222 forbearance.82 The FCC notes that though section 706
would indeed apply even if the FCC had elected to forbear from
applying section 222, the latter provides “a more certain foundation” for regulating broadband providers’ privacy-implicating conduct.83
Though the FCC elected to not forbear from applying section
222 generally, it did elect to forbear from applying section 222’s
existing CPNI rules to broadband providers, insofar as those rules
would be triggered by reclassification.84 Because those rules are
more applicable to “problems that historically arise regarding voice
service,” the FCC elects to forbear from applying those rules
“pending further proceedings” to devise Internet-specific rules.85
79

See id.
Id.
81
47 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1996).
82
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 465. For an analysis of how section
706 might come into play despite reclassification, see Daniel T. Deacon, Common Carrier
Essentialism and the Emerging Common Law of Internet Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 133
(2015) (arguing that “the emergence of [s]ection 706 as a standalone basis for jurisdiction
may push the FCC toward a more common-law, antitrust-like system of regulation than
the command-and-control-style system with which it is historically most familiar”).
83
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 465.
84
Id. para. 467.
85
Id. paras. 466–67. The Order leaves unclear when such proceedings might occur, or
when the rules they spawn might take effect. On April 28, 2015, however, the FCC held a
public workshop on consumer broadband privacy with the goals of “explor[ing] the
[FCC’s] role in protecting the privacy of consumers that use broadband Internet access
service,” “provid[ing] an opportunity for diverse stakeholders to explore a range of
matters associate with the application of statutory privacy protections to broadband
80
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B. What Does the Order Fail to Address?
The Order lacks reference to the FTC’s traditional role as a
privacy enforcer for online activity. Though the FCC describes
how it has recently wielded its section 222 power to tackle privacy
enforcement in TerraCom, it fails to draw a comparison or distinction between this power and the FTC’s section 5 enforcement
power.86 The Order does not note how the reclassification of
broadband Internet access service providers as common carriers
affects the scope of the FTC’s enforcement power.87 Nor does the
order address whether reclassification comes with any clear enforcement boundaries or limits for either agency.88
III. THE FCC’S INTERNET PRIVACY APPROACH
DRASTICALLY ALTERS THE INTERNET PRIVACY
ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE
By reclassifying broadband Internet access services as common
carriers under Title II, the FCC alters the Internet privacy enforcement landscape. Applying section 222’s privacy protection
framework to broadband Internet access service providers subjects
them to stronger privacy obligations than those to which they are
accustomed. In this vein, it may prove costly for reclassified entities to comply with these suddenly-imposed duties, and this in turn
may increase the risk that the FCC may take enforcement action
against them. Finally, reclassification gives rise to jurisdictional
challenges, as reclassification has the effect of shielding a significant group of business entities from the FTC’s enforcement authority.

Internet access service,” and “address[ing] whether and to what extent the [FCC] can
apply a harmonized privacy framework across various services within [its] jurisdiction.”
See Public Workshop on Broadband Consumer Privacy, FCC (April 28, 2015, 10:00 AM),
https://www.fcc.gov/events/wcb-and-cgb-public-workshop-broadband-consumerprivacy [https://perma.cc/6QZA-HGTV] [hereinafter Public Workshop].
86
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 53 n.48; see also supra notes 31–48
and accompanying text.
87
See generally 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1.
88
See generally id.
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A. Expanded Privacy Obligations
In electing to not forbear from applying section 222 to broadband Internet service providers, the FCC expands that provision’s
strong privacy obligations to those providers. On May 20, 2015, the
FCC released an enforcement advisory to remind reclassified entities that the Order “applies the core customer privacy protections
of [s]ection 222,” and that accordingly, they “shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network information” in the provision of services.89 Consequently, as of June 12, 2015 (the net neutrality rules’ effective
date), broadband providers are obliged to comply with expanded
requirements designed to more strongly protect consumer privacy
and restrict customer data use.90
The FCC’s enforcement advisory indicates that broadband Internet service providers should anticipate that their privacy and
data protection programs will be subject to the agency’s increased
scrutiny.91 Indeed, the enforcement advisory instructs broadband
providers to take appropriate steps to protect their customers’ privacy in accordance with section 222 until further rulemaking clarifies specifically how that section’s provisions will apply to broadband Internet access service providers.92 Until that rulemaking
takes place, it is difficult to predict precisely how the agency will
enforce those rules against providers.93
89

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY NO. 2015-03, ENFORCEMENT
BUREAU GUIDANCE: BROADBAND PROVIDERS SHOULD TAKE REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH
STEPS TO PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DA-15-603A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EM86-C2AN]
[hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY]; 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2012).
90
ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY, supra note 89; see 47 U.S.C. § 1302.
91
See ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY, supra note 89.
92
Id. at 2 (“[T]he [FCC’s] Enforcement Bureau intends to focus on whether
broadband providers are taking reasonable, good-faith steps to comply with [s]ection 222,
rather than focusing on technical details. . . . [B]roadband providers should employ
effective privacy protections in line with their privacy policies and core tenets of basic
privacy protections.”).
93
See Michael Pryor, FCC Has New Privacy Requirements for Broadband Providers,
LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/619408/fcc-has-new-privacyrequirements-for-broadband-providers [http://perma.cc/F6CX-R3J5]. Pryor suggests
that perhaps Internet-specific section 222 rules will simply adapt the types of data
protected in the Internet context. For example, perhaps the adapted rule will replace
protections for data about the number of calls a customer makes with protections for
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B. Higher Privacy Burdens and Increased Enforcement Risk
The necessity of complying with heightened privacy obligations
increases the risk that broadband Internet access service providers
will be the subject of FCC enforcement action. Before reclassification, the FCC set forth on an aggressive privacy enforcement path
in TerraCom and AT&T.94 In those cases, the FCC initiated enforcement actions based on claimed data breaches—which are not
explicitly addressed by existing section 222 provisions95—and
called on both section 222 and section 201(b) to support findings of
culpability.96 The Order affirms the FCC’s plan to broadly construe and aggressively police broadband Internet service providers’
extensive (yet undefined) privacy duties under those sections.97
This has caused concern among entities who now must comply
with those sections’ requirements.
In a May 1, 2015 lawsuit challenging the Order filed by the
American Cable Association and National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Internet service providers frequently refer to
the extensive burden associated with complying with section 222.98
customers’ bandwidth data; similarly, perhaps the rules will protect data about customer
website visits instead of customers’ call destinations.
94
See infra Part III.B. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 222.
95
See infra Part III.B.
96
See, e.g., TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, at 30;
AT&T Order and Consent Decree, supra note 51, paras. 3–5.
97
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462 n.1381 and accompanying text.
But see id. at 5985–6000 (dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael O’Rielly)
(questioning the propriety of the FCC’s aggressive approach). In public statements, FCC
Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc has described his agency’s privacy
enforcement plan as a broad and aggressive one. See, e.g., Joseph Jerome, Travis LeBlanc
on the FCC’s New Privacy Role, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2014/12/11/travis-leblanc-on-the-fccs-new-privacyrole/ [http://perma.cc/LC29-66FV]; Brendan Sasso, The FCC’s $365 Million Man,
NAT’L J. (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-fcc-s-365-milliondollar-man-20150426 [http://perma.cc/XU39-24VW].
98
See Petition of Am. Cable Ass’n and Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n for Stay
Pending Judicial Review, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket 14-28
(May 1, 2015), https://www.ncta.com/sites/prod/files/2015.05.01%20ACA_NCTA%20
Motion%20for%20Stay.pdf [https://perma.cc/D52Y-GRCT] [hereinafter Petition for
Stay] (“Petitioners’ members would face extensive burdens to comply with [s]ection
222(c)(1), including the creation of processes to ensure that CPNI is not used in
marketing without customer approval.”). The 184-page petition mentions CPNI 137
times.
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For example, Cox argues that applying existing CPNI rules to its
broadband services will force the company to “evaluate its current
processes for authenticating individuals who contact Cox via
phone, online, or in retail locations to obtain [broadband Internet
access service]-related customer data to determine whether it is
protecting customer information using processes that specifically
comply with the requirements of section 222.”99 Cox also argues
that complying with section 222 will require the company to evaluate all of its contracts with vendors that interact with broadband
Internet access service-related customer data to ensure that those
contracts provide protections sufficient to satisfy section 222’s requirements.100 Mediacom, which has more than one million broadband customers, similarly argues that compliance with section 222
requires immediate action that risks “substantial” lost costs for the
company.101
Small cable companies fear that burdens will fall heavily on
them. The lawsuit also includes declarations from some small operators, many of whom face CPNI rules for the first time because
they do not offer phone services.102 Their arguments tend to follow
a similar template and often use identical wording.103 These statements, such as the declaration of William D. Bauer, CEO of
WinDBreak Cable (a company with ten employees—three of
whom are involved with the company’s broadband Internet access
service), focus on the “serious irreparable harms” the CPNI rules
would have on the companies’ “strong personal relationships with
their customers.”104 Small providers also complain about the impending need to renegotiate contracts with partners in order to
comply with section 222’s stricter privacy rules, as well as the
technical burdens (such as upgrading computer systems) asso99

Declaration of Jennifer W. Hightower para. 7, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98.
See id.
101
Declaration of Thomas J. Larson para. 7, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98
(“Mediacom will have no choice but to implement new procedures to comply with
[s]ection 222, including updating operating manuals, implementing necessary technical or
software updates, and training its customer support staff. The substantial costs involved
in taking these potentially unneeded steps cannot be recouped if the Order’s
reclassification is vacated.”).
102
See generally Petition for Stay, supra note 98.
103
See id.
104
Declaration of William D. Bauer para. 8, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98.
100
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ciated with compliance.105 Bagley Utilities argues that it, for example, “may have to renegotiate its contracts with [Momentum Telecom, a contractor that activates Bagley’s customers’ service and
monitors Bagley’s network for outages,] to ensure that CPNI is
never used for marketing or sales purposes, and to ensure that
Momentum Telecom takes necessary precautions to ensure the
confidentiality of CPNI.”106
Bagley, like others, further notes that if customer service suffers while companies’ compliance processes are being upgraded,
the companies will never be able to recover the lost customer
goodwill.107 The small providers express fear that “[a]ny misjudgment by [the companies] about the statute’s requirements could
have catastrophic consequences,” including the possibility that the
FCC might “impose large penalties—sometimes millions of dollars—for violations of [the] CPNI rules.”108
So far, the FCC has yet to address the new privacy scheme’s
impact on small businesses; nevertheless, there remains the possibility that the FCC will take these companies’ concerns into account when it reformulates broadband-specific CPNI in future
rulemaking proceedings.
C. Jurisdictional Challenges
The FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband Internet service
providers as common carriers creates jurisdictional challenges. Before reclassification, the FTC could wield its section 5 enforcement
authority to police broadband Internet service providers’ privacy
practices.109 But as a result of reclassification, the FTC’s power to
105

Id. para. 14.
Declaration of Michael Jensen para. 14, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98.
107
Id. para. 18.
108
Declaration of William D. Bauer para. 25, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98.
109
See supra Part I.A. Under sections 5(a) and 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)
& 53(b), “the FTC may proceed against unfair practices even if those practices [also]
violate some other statute . . . .” FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir.
2009) (referring to a provision of the Telecommunications Act); see also FTC v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00967 (W.D. Wa. July 1, 2014) (exemplifying action against
common carrier for deceptive and unfair practices in violation of the FTC Act resulting
from T-Mobile’s placing third-party charges on telephone bills); FED. TRADE COMM’N,
BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 38–41 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition106
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bring privacy enforcement actions against broadband providers is
significantly reduced, as the FTC Act’s common carrier exemption
bars the FTC from policing so-classified entities when they engage
in common carriage services.110 Representatives from the FTC
have spoken out against reclassification because of this effect.111
Accordingly, there is a need for courts, Congress, or the agencies
themselves to determine whether and how privacy enforcement
responsibilities should be assigned.
1. The Common Carrier Exception
Per the FTC Act, the FTC lacks authority over “common carriers.”112 Under the Act, the FTC is empowered to wield its authority to prevent commercial entities, “except [for] . . . banks . . .
common carriers . . . air carriers . . . [and others] . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”113
Courts have long recognized that the FTC Act’s exceptions are
“binding and unalterable.”114 As far back as 1920, the court in T.C.
Hurst & Son v. FTC115 described the FTC’s lack of authority to regulate common carriers under the FTC Act.116 In Hurst, the court
reviewed the express language of the Act and concluded that
“[b]anks and common carriers [are] doubtless excepted from the
act.”117 In 1962, the Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion in the
antitrust case United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,.118 and

policy/v070000report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWY4-3BP4] [hereinafter BROADBAND
CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY] (analyzing the application of section 5 of the FTC
Act to broadband services).
110
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
111
BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 109, at 41.
112
38 Stat. 717, §§ 5–6 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 46(a),
46(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
113
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
114
Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Bryan Tramont, Commission on the Verge of a
Jurisdictional Breakdown: The FCC and Its Quest to Regulate Advertising, 8 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 219, 223 (2000).
115
268 F. 874 (E.D. Va. 1920).
116
See id.
117
Id. at 877.
118
374 U.S. 321 (1962).
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held that the FTC’s authority is limited by the FTC Act’s exceptions.119
Cases specifically involving common carriers similarly confirm
the FTC’s lack of enforcement authority over them. For example,
in FTC v. Miller,120 the court held that the FTC lacked authority to
enforce a subpoena against a common carrier due to the statutory
exception.121 In that case, the FTC attempted to investigate whether an interstate motor home carrier engaged in unlawful advertising
practices, and as part of the investigation, the FTC subpoenaed
some of the company’s records.122 The company cited the common
carrier exception as a defense to oppose the subpoenas, and the
FTC sought enforcement in district court.123 In overturning a district court ruling, the Sixth Circuit cited the common carrier exemption and dismissed the FTC’s argument that advertising by
common carriers is a non-common carrier activity falling within
FTC control.124 In so holding, the court confirmed that the common carrier exception is one of a number of “carve outs” in FTC
authority.125
2. FTC Has Been Outspoken Against the Order’s Effect On
Its Enforcement Authority
The FTC has expressed discontent that reclassification of
broadband Internet access service providers as Title II common
carriers exempts those entities from its enforcement reach when
they engage in common carriage services.126 Indeed, FTC repre119

See id. at 336 n.11.
549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977).
121
See id. at 461.
122
Id. at 454.
123
See id.
124
See id. at 455–58 (noting that “[t]he regulatory approach articulated by the [FTC],
while it may be a desirable one, is not the one Congress appears to have adopted”).
125
See id. at 459 (“Congress’ recognition of a regulatory gap with respect to banks is
implicitly a recognition of such a gap with respect to common carriers as well.”).
126
Although section 5 exempts enforcement against “common carrier” activities, this
exemption does not apply to common carriers’ provision of other, non-common carriage
services. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2) (2006); see also FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d
48, 58–60 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475,
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608
(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
120
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sentatives have been publicly outspoken against this result. In the
press, FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhaussen has made reclassification’s effect clear: “If an entity is a common carrier providing
common carrier services, [the FTC] can’t bring actions against
them.”127 Other officials have been more harsh. In a statement before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary
titled Wrecking the Internet to Save It? The FCC’s Net Neutrality
Rule, FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright cites the FTC’s “expertise” and “vigor[ ]” in protecting privacy to argue that reclassification results in “obstacles to protecting consumers . . . by depriving the FTC of its long-standing jurisdiction in [the] area” and
“threaten[s] the robust consumer protection efforts that the agency has engaged in over the last two decades.”128 Jessica Rich, director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, laments that the
FCC’s decision “takes an experienced cop off the beat in this important area.”129
Despite the FTC’s opinion to the contrary, some advocates for
reclassification view the FCC’s newly broadened oversight of Internet service providers as a win for consumers.130 These proponents posit that the FCC’s enforcement approach will benefit consumers more than the FTC’s approach does.131 Though the FTC
issues guidance and other notices to inform consumers and indus127

See Brian Fung, How to End a Fight Over Who Should Regulate Internet Providers,
WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2015/03/26/could-the-ftcs-inability-to-regulate-internet-providers-come-to-an-end/
[https://perma.cc/X5CD-NMGC].
128
Wrecking The Internet To Save It? The FCC’s Net Neutrality Rule: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 43–44 (2015) (statement of Joshua D. Wright,
Commissioner, FTC), www.judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=6624
EC59-DB2B-45B3-9615-0E689F4CBF37 [http://perma.cc/9VUJ-TLZU] [hereinafter
Wrecking the Internet].
129
Brendan Sasso, Net Neutrality Has Sparked an Interagency Squabble Over Internet
Privacy, NAT’L J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-future-ofbroadband/net-neutrality-has-sparked-an-interagency-squabble-over-internet-privacy20150309 [http://perma.cc/L7YN-ZKC4].
130
See Andrea Peterson, The FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision Could Mean Stronger Privacy
Rules for Internet Service Providers, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/02/27/the-fccs-netneutrality-decision-could-mean-stronger-privacy-rules-for-internet-service-providers/
[https://perma.cc/K8CA-4QEM].
131
Id.
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try about which practices might trigger enforcement, the agency’s
enforcement is mostly reactive: that is, it often must wait for a
company to engage in a practice that the agency considers unfair or
deceptive before initiating investigatory or enforcement action.132
In the privacy context, this usually involves holding companies to
their own broadly defined privacy policies and punishing companies for policy breaches that may occur.133
The FCC, on the other hand, has broad rule-making authority
that empowers the agency to “set standards that companies will
have to abide by before the troubling practices have even taken
place.”134 According to Harold Feld, Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge, “[t]he FCC’s privacy regulations have worked very
well, which is why so many people are unaware of them—because
they are so rigid about enforcing them, people don’t even have to
think about it.”135 So far, the agency has proven to be an aggressive
enforcer of current privacy rules as they apply telephone providers.136 By using its leverage, it is argued, the FCC might be able to
take control over some controversial online practices—such as the
use of “supercookies”137—more effectively than could the FTC.138
Proponents also note that despite reclassification, the FTC is
not completely barred from regulating online privacy, as the net
neutrality rules not foreclose the FTC’s ability to police troublesome privacy practices committed by non-common carrier Internet
services and websites.139 Just as the FTC can investigate and bring
enforcement actions against telemarketers (even though they
132

See supra Part I.A.
See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy
Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003).
134
Peterson, supra note 130.
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., supra notes 38–65 and accompanying text.
137
“Supercookies” are persistent unique identifiers that some mobile broadband
providers have been inserting onto their customers’ devices that allow tracking
companies to follow the customers’ activity even if they have deleted or disabled cookies.
See Natasha Singer & Brian X. Chen, Verizon’s Mobile “Supercookies” Seen as Threat to
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/technology/
verizons-mobile-supercookies-seen-as-threat-to-privacy.html [http://perma.cc/ZNP6AVRY].
138
See Peterson, supra note 130.
139
See id.
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communicate using phone lines), the FTC will also be able to investigate and bring enforcement actions against Internet services,
rather than the carriers of those services.140 Indeed, actions against
services rather than carriers themselves make up the bulk of the
FTC’s online enforcement to date.141
3. What Explains the Interagency Tension Here?
Given the FTC’s still-prominent privacy enforcement role
even after reclassification, it is somewhat curious that the agency
has expressed such discontent at its having a broad swath of companies removed from its enforcement scope. Why is the FTC so
sensitive about having its privacy jurisdiction limited in this way?
FTC Commissioner Ohlhaussen has cited consumer protectionism as the primary reason for the FTC’s unease with reclassification.142 She publicly noted that her concern “is really not so
much for the FTC, but for the loss to consumers—that they would
lose out from having the FTC’s active oversight.”143
In a recent Forbes article, former FCC Wireless Bureau Chief
Fred Campbell expounds on what such “loss” might entail.144 He
bases his analysis on the recent merger between Verizon and
AOL.145 Through this merger, Verizon hopes to harness AOL’s
targeted advertising capabilities so that Verizon can expand into
the advertising market as the mobile market slows.146 While the
140
See id. (“The FCC will oversee the pipes, while the FTC will be able to wield their
enforcement tools against those who operate services that use the pipes.”).
141
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Enforcement Actions, FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW
INFO. POL’Y (June 24, 2014), www.law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/CLIP_Privacy_Case_
Report_-_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8LZ-E8NR] (presenting an “objective and
comprehensive survey of the online privacy issues litigated in FTC enforcement
actions”).
142
See Fung, supra note 127.
143
See id.
144
See generally Fred Campbell, Privacy Concerns About Verizon-AOL Deal Are Really
Concerns About Increased Competition, FORBES (May 18, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/realspin/2015/05/18/privacy-concerns-about-verizon-aol-deal-are-really-concernsabout-increased-competition/ [http://perma.cc/44LA-6XKP].
145
See Clarie Groden, Verizon Now Officially Owns AOL, TIME (June 23, 2015),
http://time.com/3931793/verizon-now-officially-owns-aol/
[http://perma.cc/DX9HUV9M].
146
See Kevin Fitchard, The Real Reason Verizon Bought AOL, FORTUNE (June 24, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/verizon-gains-aol/
[http://perma.cc/S53S-RLHR]
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deal is generally viewed as raising no novel privacy issues, some
groups oppose it on the basis that the new entity’s power to deliver
targeted advertising, as well as the substantial data collection that
will be required to do so, seriously endangers consumer privacy.147
This, according to the deal’s opponents, should oblige the FCC to
“move quickly” to impose strong privacy requirements for broadband Internet access service providers.148
However, Campbell argues that opponents’ urging that the
FCC “interfere[ ]” in Internet privacy amounts to a tactic to help
edge providers such as Google and Facebook stave off competition
in the advertising market:
Verizon’s [purchase of] AOL for $4.4 billion should
be no big deal for regulators. The [FCC] already announced that it won’t review the deal and there is
no reason to think antitrust regulators will raise
concerns. But that hasn’t stopped Silicon Valley’s
advertising giants from attempting to leverage the
deal into new regulations that would help them tighten their grip on Internet advertising markets. It’s
understandable that Internet advertising’s market
leaders are worried about the deal’s potential to increase competition for lucrative ad dollars in mobile
and over-the-top markets. Google and Facebook
dominate mobile advertising and would undoubtedly like to keep it that way. Though they have little to
fear from AOL today, a Verizon-AOL combo would
be a credible competitive threat to their monopolistic ambitions. That’s why their friends in Washington want the FCC to start interfering in Internet
(“From Verizon’s standpoint, it needs to find something it can sell via its available
networks . . . . That’s where AOL comes in[:] . . . it [ ] has put together a sophisticated
suite of advertising technologies for online and traditional media that no other company
(aside from Google and Facebook) can match.”).
147
See Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge Urges FCC to Issue NPRM to Protect Consumer
Privacy, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (May 12, 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/pressrelease/public-knowledge-urges-fcc-to-issue-nprm-to-protect-consumer-privacy
[https://perma.cc/MVR9-KP8Q] (citing Senior Vice President Harold Feld, who argues
that the deal “raises extremely substantial and urgent privacy concerns”).
148
Id.
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privacy issues. [The FCC enforcing] new rules prohibiting Internet service providers from tracking
consumers online would keep Verizon out of their
markets and could have the effect of killing the deal
even if antitrust regulators approve it.149
Campbell raises a few arguments to support his position. First,
he echoes the idea that the Verizon-AOL merger does not raise any
novel privacy issues, as Google and Facebook already derive substantial benefit—tens of millions of dollars per year—from targeted
advertising empowered by data collection.150 Moreover, the groups
opposing the merger “don’t seem to care” about Google and Facebook’s data collection practices: they asked the FCC to regulate
only Verizon and other ISPs, and not Google or Facebook.151
Second, he argues that if opponents were genuinely concerned
with consumer privacy, they would have appealed to the FTC instead of the FCC, as the former’s enforcement history is much
more substantial than the latter’s.152 For example, while the FTC
fined Google $22.5 million for misrepresenting its use of cookies in
August 2012,153 the FCC in that same year fined Google a mere
$25,000 for its unauthorized collection of highly sensitive consumer Wi-Fi data in relation to its Street View project—even though
Google was determined to have had “deliberately impeded and delayed” the FCC’s investigation.154
Third, Campbell argues that the structure of the net neutrality
rules is designed to have a competition-inhibiting effect.155 Though
the FCC could have adopted net neutrality rules that would not
149

Id.; see also Fitchard, supra note 146.
See Campbell, supra note 144.
151
Id. And not coincidentally, the same groups that oppose the merger advocated that
the FCC assume jurisdiction over Internet privacy during the net neutrality debate. See
id.. But see supra note 129 and accompanying text (highlighting the remarks of a Public
Knowledge official supportive of the FCC’s new privacy reach).
152
See Campbell, supra note 144.
153
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it
Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, FTC (Aug. 9,
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc/VLK6-EZXT].
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See In re Google, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 27 FCC Rcd.
4012, para. 4 (2012); see also Campbell, supra note 144.
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See Campbell, supra note 144.
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have encroached upon the FTC’s privacy jurisdiction over Internet
service providers, the FCC instead opted to apply “an outdated
privacy statute designed for telephone services” that excludes the
FTC from governing them.156 Campbell asserts that “[n]o one
should be surprised that Google and Facebook are now attempting
to entrench their dominance over Internet advertising by arbitraging this new jurisdictional split over online privacy,” and that
“[t]he jurisdictional split created by the net neutrality order
enables . . . discriminatory result while maintaining a false veneer of
consumer protection.”157
Campbell’s theory is subject to criticism. Though he suggests
that some edge providers such as Google and Facebook are bedfellows with the FCC, the agency might yet regulate those providers.
Professor Daniel Deacon argues that Communications Act section
706, as interpreted by courts, gives the FCC a potentially broad
power to regulate services that fall without its core jurisdiction over
common carriers.158
Section 706(a) of the Communications Act directs the FCC to:
[E]ncourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner
consistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the
local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.159
Similarly, section 706(b) requires the FCC to conduct an annual inquiry “concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans,” and, if it finds that such
availability is lacking, to “take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure

156
157
158
159

See id.
Id.
See generally Deacon, supra note 82.
47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2002).
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investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.”160
The FCC relied on section 706—a non-Title II basis—as justification for the no-blocking and nondiscrimination net neutrality
rules it proposed in its 2010 Open Internet Order.161 There, the
FCC explained that the rules in that Order promoted the policies
outlined in section 706 because they supported “virtuous cycle of
innovation.”162 Upon a challenge to this Order, the D.C. Circuit
determined that the FCC’s conclusion that section 706(a) “constitutes an affirmative grant of regulatory authority” was a reasonable
one.163 Additionally, the court upheld the FCC’s determination
that section 706(b) “empower[ed] it to take steps to accelerate
broadband deployment if and when it determines that such deployment is not reasonable and timely.”164 And both sections, the
court concluded, authorize the FCC to directly regulate broadband
providers (instead of merely to promote infrastructure deployment
via other means).165 Although it agreed with the FCC’s jurisdictional arguments, the D.C. Circuit in the end vacated the Order’s
no-blocking and nondiscrimination rules.166 Nevertheless, the
court’s decision is significant to the extent that it affirmed the
FCC’s section 706 authority to regulate companies—namely,
broadband Internet access providers—that were the same as, or
closely allied with, those telephone and cable operators the FCC
has traditionally regulated.167
According to Professor Deacon, this decision contributes to the
FCC having “a malleable and potentially broad jurisdiction over
Internet Protocol-based networks and services.”168 He notes that
160

Id. § 1302(b).
See In re Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, para.
1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order].
162
See id. para. 123. Under the “virtuous cycle,” “new uses of the [broadband]
network—including new content, applications, services, and devices—lead to increased
end-user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements, which in turn lead
to further innovative network uses.” Id. para. 14.
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Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 637–40 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 641 (internal quotations omitted).
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See id. at 643.
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See id. at 650–59.
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See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 161, para. 49.
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Deacon, supra note 82, at 134.
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“there is nothing inherent in the nature of [section] 706 that would
limit the reach of that section to those particular providers.”169
Consequently, Deacon argues, the FCC could cite the section’s
potentially expansive authority to regulate entities that fall outside
the FCC’s traditional jurisdictional bounds.170 To exemplify his
theory, Professor Deacon builds a hypothetical involving Google
and Facebook that could be read as a direct response to former
Wireless Bureau Chief Campbell’s argument:
Take, as the most prominent example, edge providers such as Google or Facebook. The Open Internet
Order regulated broadband Internet access providers in order to promote innovation by edge providers. But there is no reason that FCC could not use
its [section] 706 power instead to regulate edge providers directly, at least as long as it could tell a credible story regarding why such regulation enabled innovation at the edge (in turn spurring consumer
demand for broadband and, with it, broadband infrastructure deployment, under the “virtuous
cycle” theory).171
Professor Deacon further argues that such a prospect is “not
fanciful.”172 He considers a case from 2012 in which the FTC investigated Google over allegations that the company manipulated
search results to favor its own services.173 Professor Deacon explains that the issue in that case was “conceptually similar” to issues in the net neutrality dispute, and that in such cases, the FCC
may find intervention to be appropriate.174
Given Professor Deacon’s argument, it may be difficult to rationalize Mr. Campbell’s theory that reclassification and strong
privacy rules for broadband Internet providers suggest an attempt
169

Id. at 173.
See id.
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See id. at 173–74.
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See id. at 174; see also Steve Lohr, Drafting Antitrust Case, F.T.C. Raises Pressure on
Google, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/
ftc-staff-prepares-antitrust-case-against-google-over-search.html [http://perma.cc/F9ZSUZ8Y].
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to promote anticompetitive behavior, and that this has stirred the
FTC’s ire. Though Deacon’s argument does not necessarily defeat
Campbell’s, it posits a theory that potentially weakens it. If anything, the combination of theories raises more questions than it
does provide answers about the true reasons for the FTC’s discontent with the FCC’s decision making. But whether or not we have a
full explanation, a tension remains between the two agencies. How
might it be resolved?
IV.

POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING THE INTERAGENCY
TENSION
Despite differences between the agencies, the possibility for a
robust and effective Internet privacy enforcement regime persists.
For example, new privacy rules for broadband Internet service providers might delineate enforcement responsibilities between the
FCC and the FTC, while clarifying industry’s obligations and consumers’ expectations under the new enforcement regime. Alternatively, congressional action could remove the statutory bar that
prohibits the FTC from enforcing against common carriers. Alternatively, or in addition to a repeal of the common carrier exception,
the FCC and FTC could share cooperative privacy enforcement
authority, as they share authority in other non-privacy areas. In this
Part, I explore these possibilities.
A. New Rules
New CPNI rules, as devised through rulemaking proceeding,
will clarify how section 222 applies to broadband Internet access
service provider. Unlike the Order, these rules could address and
suggest a remedy for the FCC’s capture of the FTC’s authority to
police providers’ privacy practices.
The FCC states in its Order that rulemaking proceedings to
this end will take place, but it leaves unclear when such proceedings might occur, or when the rules they produce might take effect.175 However, in a late June 2015 speech, FCC Chairman Tom

175

See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 467.
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Wheeler confirmed that the agency would commence privacy
rulemaking in the fall of that year.176
In April 28, 2015, the FCC hosted a public workshop on consumer broadband privacy that could potentially provide a preview
of how Internet-specific rules might appear.177 The FCC’s purposes for hosting the event were to “explore the [FCC’s] role in protecting the privacy of consumers that use broadband Internet
access service,” “provide an opportunity for diverse stakeholders
to explore a range of matters associated with the application of statutory privacy protections to broadband Internet access service,”
and “address whether and to what extent the [FCC] can apply a
harmonized privacy framework across various services within [its]
jurisdiction.”178
Members of the workshop’s second panel discussed section
222’s application to broadband Internet access services.179 Panelists agreed that this application is complicated;180 some panelists
debated about the extent to which section 222 is suitable to accommodate a privacy framework for Internet service providers, as
well as the extent to which it is appropriate for the FCC to impose
an obligation to protect “proprietary information” in the Internet
context.181 Similarly, the panelists grappled with how to best define
“customer proprietary network information” in that context.182
One panelist argued that anti-fraud, cybersecurity, and research-enabling principles should guide the FCC’s revised applica-
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See Mario Trujillo, FCC to Start Work on Broadband Privacy in Fall, HILL (June 26,
2015),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/246259-fcc-to-start-work-on-broadbandprivacy-in-fall [http://perma.cc/V3MX-TVPV].
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See Public Workshop, supra note 85.
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See id.; see also Morgan Kennedy, FCC’s Broadband Consumer Privacy Public
Workshop, NAT’L L. REV. (May 5, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fcc-sbroadband-consumer-privacy-public-workshop
[http://perma.cc/X6UV-8WB5]
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See Kennedy, supra note 179.
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See id.
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Panelist Jim Halpert of DLA Piper argued that many of section 222’s provisions do
not apply smoothly to ISPs, and noted that “personally identifiable information” is not
part of section 222’s definition of CPNI. See id. Similarly, panelist Nancy Libin of
Wilkinson Barker Knauer cautioned against defining CPNI too broadly. See id.
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tion of section 222.183 Another panelist argued that the FCC should
mimic the FTC’s approach and issue guidance documents and
hold workshops that provide standards and encourage strong privacy practices so that industry can keep step with a rapidly evolving landscape.184 Some panelists similarly argued that the FCC
should adopt an FTC-like set of criteria so one set of rules fulfills
both consumer and industry expectations.185
Later, in a May 2015 web conference organized by the International Association of Privacy Professionals, FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Deputy Chief Matthew DelNero stated that the
agency is looking to gather “creative” input from stakeholders
about how to best integrate its broadened privacy authority within
existing enforcement regimes.186 DelNero stressed that the agency
is “really very much in an information-gathering mode and [is] really trying to hear from all the different stakeholders about what the
important areas are.”187 He noted that though “[t]he [April] workshop was a good start, [the agency’s] doors are very much open,
and [the FCC] hope[s] that the workshop gets people thinking
good and creative thoughts about where [it] go[es] from here.”188
According to DelNero, FCC Commissioner Tom Wheeler and
his colleagues have taken care to point out that the April workshop
was only the “beginning of a process,” and that the FCC intends to
take a “careful and deliberative approach” toward privacy.189 As
part of this approach, the FCC will likely implement further informal steps for hearing stakeholder input before official rulemaking
begins.190
During the web conference, DelNero noted that some stakeholders have expressed a preference for rules that create a harmo-
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nized enforcement approach.191 For example, fellow panelist Debbie Matties, Vice President of iPrivacy CTIA, argued that the FCC
must find a way to regulate privacy in a manner that does not intrude upon existing regulations or active regulators, including the
FTC.192 This, DelNero concludes, suggests that “maybe broadband providers are less concerned with uncertainty per se and more
concerned that when [the FCC] does rulemaking, it keeps in mind
the broader ecosystem and how [s]ection 222 interacts with other
statutory authorities.”193
Though new rules would likely clarify industry’s privacy obligations and give consumers a clear framework for their privacy expectations with respect to how broadband providers handle their
information, it is yet unclear whether or how such rules might respond to FTC and stakeholders’ concerns about privacy enforcement. Though DelNero’s statements suggest that the FCC may
consider these concerns during its rulemaking process, it is unclear
whether such is likely to occur. If rulemaking fails to supply a resolution, means other than formal rulemaking might be more effective for loosening the interagency tension.
B. Repeal of the Common Carrier Exception
As an alternative to, or as an addition to new CPNI rules, Congress might repeal the common carrier exception to eliminate the
bar that keeps the FTC from regulating common carriers. Some
stakeholders have called on Congress to do just that.194 According
to FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, the common carrier exception is “outdated” and unnecessarily shackles the FTC’s ability to
protect consumers.195
191
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See Ramirez Urges Repeal of Common Carrier Exemption, FTC:WATCH (Feb. 13,
2015), http://www.ftcwatch.com/ramirez-urges-repeal-of-common-carrier-exemption/
[http://perma.cc/YW84-2G94] (subscription required); see also Letter from Mike
Ananny, et. al to FTC Commissioners (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.pijip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Net-Neutrality-Prof-Letter-01292015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q762-LJNX].
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See Ramirez Urges Repeal of Common Carrier Exemption, supra note 194. In 2003,
then-FTC Chairman Timothy Muris similarly argued that the exemption “dates from a
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Recently, officials from both agencies have endorsed the idea of
eliminating the common carrier exception.196 In a March 2015
House Judiciary Committee hearing, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler said that “[the] idea is definitely worthy of review,” and that
“[the FCC] should work in tandem with the FTC.”197 He further
noted that the partnership would amount to “a great one-two
punch.”198 FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny echoed this
sentiment, arguing that because “[t]here are slightly different tools
in the FCC toolbox and in the FTC toolbox,” she supports repeal.199
If the common carrier exception is successfully repealed, the
agencies would have wider authority to police consumer harms, as
the resulting legal landscape would empower both the FTC and the
FCC to regulate common carriers whose activities warrant investigation and enforcement. A repeal of the common carrier exception
would likely lead to greater cooperation between the two agencies.200
C. Co-Governance
In 2003, Professor Christopher Yoo wrote that “technological
convergence” would require a farewell bid to the days in which varying communications services in use could “occupy[ ] a separate
regulatory silo.”201 He suggested that “the ultimate destiny . . .
that the various communications platforms will serve as complements, rather than substitutes . . . raises the possibility that new
types of regulation that would allow the sharing of each network
might have to be created.”202

highly regulated monopolies.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners Testify on
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In modern times, this “new type of regulation” may be cogovernance. Co-governance regulatory regimes already in place
suggest that the FCC and FTC might adopt a similar regime for
online privacy governance. As it stands, each agency participates in
co-governance schemes already, both with other agencies and with
each other.
1. FTC and FCC Co-Governance with Other Agencies
Both the FTC and the FCC already engage in complementary
co-governance schemes with other government agencies. For example, the FTC along with the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulate food labeling. Similarly, both the FTC and the FCC join forces
with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to enforce against
anticompetitive behavior by reviewing mergers and acquisitions.
a) Food Labeling (FTC/FDA/USDA)
The FTC, FDA, and USDA share jurisdiction over claims that
food manufacturers make about their products pursuant to a complementary statutory scheme. In this context, the FTC relies on
section 5 of the FTC Act to police “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices” and sections 12 and 15 of the Act prohibit “any false advertisement” that is “misleading in a material respect.”203 Similarly, the FDA derives its authority in this context from the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act section 403(a), which prohibits
“labeling [that] is false or misleading in any particular.”204 The
USDA authority stems from the Federal Meat Inspection Act,
which prohibits labeling of meat or meat products that is “false or
misleading in any particular,”205 and the Poultry Products Inspection Act, which prohibits labeling of poultry products that is “false
or misleading in any particular.”206
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Since 1954, the FTC and the FDA have cooperated under a
Memorandum of Understanding.207 Under this agreement, the
FTC regulates food advertising, while the FDA regulates food
labeling.208 In addition, the agreement affirms the agencies’ shared
commitment to: (1) prevent public deception; (2) coordinate their
work to eliminate duplicative effort; and (3) promote consistency
in handling matters of mutual concern.209
b) Anticompetitive Behavior (FTC/DOJ)
Both the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division enforce federal
antitrust laws.210 While they share some overlapping jurisdiction, in
practice the two agencies’ efforts complement one another by relying on their expertise in different markets.211 For example, the FTC
often regulates in economic spaces that involve high consumer
spending, such as health care, pharmaceuticals, professional services, food, energy, and technology.212 Before either agency begins
an investigation, it consults with the other to avoid duplicative enforcement of the same transaction; this way, each agency may conserve staff resources and avoid placing the same party in a form of
double jeopardy.213
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The initiation point for the federal antitrust review process for
mergers is the Hart-Scott-Rodino filing.214 The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act provides that parties may not complete certain mergers, acquisitions, or types of asset transfers until
they have made a detailed filing with the FTC and DOJ, and have
waited for those agencies to determine that the proposed transaction does not violate antitrust law.215 After a preliminary review of
filed materials, antitrust regulators may make a “second request”
for additional information.216 Based on precedent, antitrust lawyers
can predict when a second request will be made in relation to a particular transaction.217 Consequently, the Hart-Scott-Rodino procedure is considered to be “clear, predictable, [and] lawful . . . .”218
If antitrust authorities deem that a proposed merger presents
anticompetitive problems, the authorities have power to challenge
the merger in federal court.219 However, actual court challenges are
“extremely rare,” as parties whose proposed mergers face anticompetitive problems often modify or withdraw altogether their
proposals.220 This tidy process eliminates the need for “redundant” federal merger review.221
Over the years, the FTC and DOJ agencies have developed and
published multiple revisions of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
which describe the analytical framework the agencies follow when
reviewing horizontal mergers.222 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
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revised in 2010, “are the product of an extensive team effort” between the agencies.223 As Carl Shapiro224 describes:
The process for revising the Guidelines was lengthy,
collaborative, and open: the [a]gencies posted a series of questions, inviting public comment on possible revisions; numerous useful public comments
were received and reviewed; the [a]gencies sponsored five public workshops at which panelists discussed possible revisions to the Guidelines; subsequently, the FTC made public a draft of the proposed Guidelines, again inviting additional public
comments; numerous thoughtful comments were
again received and reviewed; and in response to
those comments, the proposed Guidelines were further clarified.225
Additionally, the agencies collaborated to produce a Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.226 In that document, the
agencies provide specific examples of how they have applied the
Guidelines’ analytic principles in previously reviewed mergers.227
c) Anticompetitive Behavior (FCC/DOJ)
Though the FTC generally has authority to review mergers and
acquisitions under sections 1 and 6 of the FTC Act,228 the Clayton
Act strips the FTC of its jurisdiction to review mergers and acquisitions between common carriers (in accordance with the common
223
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See DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/
215247.pdf [http://perma.cc/6K7U-GT4D] [hereinafter Commentary]. Though it
predates the 2010 guidelines, the Commentary “remains a valuable supplement” to
them. See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 222, at 1 n.1.
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See generally Commentary, supra note 226.
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carrier exception) and vests that authority in the FCC instead.229
Just as other types of mergers require approval by the FTC and the
DOJ, telecommunications mergers require approval from both the
FCC and the DOJ.230
Under this co-governance scheme, the agencies’ statutory
mandates differ.231 Per section 7 of the Clayton Act, the DOJ may
prohibit any acquisition that would “substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.”232 The Hart-ScotRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976233 provides for a merger preclearance process that ensures timely DOJ review of any
proposed merger.234 A DOJ challenge to a proposed merger requires that the DOJ bear the burden of proof that the proposed
merger violates antitrust laws.235 As William J. Rinner notes, this is
a “crucial” procedural posture, as DOJ-reviewed mergers are
“presumed not to substantially lessen competition absent a contrary showing.”236 As a result, the DOJ’s merger analyses lead to
predictable standards on which companies can rely.237
The FCC, on the other hand, reviews mergers according to a
broad “public interest” standard for license transfers, as articulated in the Communications Act sections 214 and 310.238 Under
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231
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this “amorphous”239 standard, the parties must affirmatively prove
that the proposed transaction would serve the public interest, or
alternatively, that “any likely anticompetitive effect is more than
offset by other benefits.”240 Though the FCC views itself as a
“shadow DOJ” that analyzes mergers to determine how they will
influence telecommunications industry competition, the two agencies’ approaches are, in reality, “markedly different.”241
FCC merger review follows similarly the informal adjudication
model the agency uses to review new license applications.242 But in
other aspects, it retains some elements of rulemaking.243 Unlike the
DOJ, the FCC faces no statutory deadline for completing its review.244 The FCC rarely follows a self-imposed 180-day review
deadline,245 which leads to “long delays that risk undermining the
very reasons for a merger.”246
Before it approves a merger, the FCC may request concessions—conditions the merging parties must meet to win approval.247 In cases where the FCC does this, the merging parties must
either negotiate the conditions requested by the FCC or otherwise
risk participation in a rare formal adjudicatory hearing, the prospective costs of which are “sufficiently high to deter any proposed
239
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240
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merger.”248 Through these negotiations, which are guided by the
overseeing commissioners’ sense of whether pro-competitive factors and benefits to the public interest outweigh any perceived
costs that the merger might impose, the FCC molds the transaction
into a form that meets its approval.249 Agreement to the FCC’s
conditions often results in merging parties’ sacrificing most avenues for judicial review of the merger’s final approval order.250
To determine the range and scope of any conditions, the FCC
conducts an antitrust analysis that closely mirrors the steps outlined in the DOJ/FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines.251 This analysis focuses more intensely on the proposed merger’s effect on potentially relevant market participants than does the DOJ’s prospective competition review.252
The FCC’s antitrust authority has been widely criticized. The
FCC/DOJ dual-standard regime for reviewing telecommunications
mergers, it is argued, is inefficient and unworkable: the process results in no written rules, precedents, or guidance; it imposes unnecessary, difficult-to-calculate costs on merging parties; and it fails
to yield consistent, predictable results across industry sectors.253 As
a result, the viability of FCC merger review co-governance faces
much skepticism.254
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2. The FCC and FTC Already Co-Govern in Some Areas
The FCC and FTC share complementary jurisdiction in other
areas already. The two agencies have successfully cooperated on
issues involving special telephone services such as “900-numbers”
and “dial-around” services, as well as in the context of “cramming.”
a) 900-Numbers
The FCC and FTC, along with the U.S. Postal Service, share
jurisdiction over the 900-number telephone services industry.255
The FCC assigns the 900 area code, which designates that a certain
type of call is being made rather than designating a call’s geographic location.256 Consumers can call 900-numbers to purchase information or service via phone.257
In this context, the FCC monitors long-distance carriers who
provide 900-numbers, and shares jurisdiction with individual states
over billing and collection services.258 In tandem, the FTC investigates the complaints of consumers who allege that they were overcharged for 900-number services or did not receive those services
as advertised.259 U.S. Postal Service inspectors have authority to
investigate 900-number-related fraud in cases where consumers’
use of the services involves mail delivery.260
b) Dial-around Services
Another example of FCC and FTC collaboration is the agencies’ Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the Advertising of DialAround and Other Long-Distance Services To Consumers (“Joint Ad-

double jeopardy not faced by merging parties in other industries. Peculiar and potentially
unlawful results are reached leading to a patchwork quilt of company-specific rules.”).
255
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vertising Guidelines”).261 To protect consumers from improper
statements and disclosures contained in certain advertisements for
dial-around long-distance services, the agencies jointly developed
the Joint Advertising Guidelines to address which dial-around advertising approaches are permissible and which are misleading.262
These services, which include “10-10-XXX” numbers, enable customers to bypass, or dial-around their pre-selected long-distance
service provider for a given telephone to use a different service
provider.263 The March 1, 2000 Guidelines establish basic principles to which dial-around advertisers must adhere, including
truthfulness, disclosure, clarity, and conspicuousness.264
Concurrent with the Joint Advertising Guidelines, the FCC
announced that it fined MCI WorldCom Inc., a dial-around services company, $100 thousand for making misleading statements
about its rates in advertisements.265
c) “Cramming”
The FTC and FCC join efforts to protect against “cramming”—the term given to the placing of unwanted or morefrequently-than-expected extra charges to customers’ telephone
bills.266 Often, cramming results from scammers’ attaching difficult-to-spot charges to text message services such as text-based ho-

261

See In re Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the Advertising of Dial-Around and
Other Long-Distance Services To Consumers, Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. 8654, para.
1 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Advertising Guidelines]; see also Furchtgott-Roth & Tramont,
supra note 114, at 219–20.
262
See Joint Advertising Guidelines, supra note 261, para. 10.
263
See id. para. 3.
264
See id. paras. 11–14.
265
See In re MCI WorldCom, Inc., Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 4545 (2000); Peter S.
Goodman, FCC Fines MCI WorldCom for “Dial-Around” Ads, WASH. POST (March 1,
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2000/03/01/fcc-fines-mciworldcom-for-dial-around-ads/5a97d5e2-9817-45d5-8c7e-d4fe6cdb0897/
[http://perma.cc/6T77-4RY4].
266
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE CRAMMING: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 7, 11 (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/mobile-cramming-federal-tradecommission-staff-report-july-2014/140728mobilecramming.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TPEKVF]; Cramming—Unauthorized Charges on Your Phone Bill, FCC (May 12, 2015),
https://www.fcc.gov/guides/cramming-unauthorized-misleading-or-deceptive-chargesplaced-your-telephone-bill [http://perma.cc/49MF-H6XS].

270

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:225

roscopes or trivia games.267 Phone service carriers often take a cut
of these extra fees.268
In May 2015, Verizon Wireless and Sprint were forced to pay
$90 million and $68 million, respectively, to settle joint investigations by the FCC and FTC that revealed that both companies profited from cramming.269 A similar joint investigation in 2014 resulted in AT&T’s having to pay $105 million to settle cramming
charges.270 In its statement on the settlement, the FCC cited the
investigation as “a prime example of government agencies working
together on behalf of American consumers.”271
3. Is There Opportunity for FCC/FTC Cooperation in the
Online Privacy Context?
Just as the FCC and FTC collaborate and co-govern in the 900number and the dial-around service contexts, the two agencies
might cooperate similarly in the Internet privacy context. In the
April 28, 2015 Public Workshop on Broadband Consumer Privacy,
FCC and FTC officials expressed a desire to work together to regulate and enforce new rules governing how CPNI data will be collected, shared, used, and stored.272 The FTC expressed a similar
sentiment in a 2014 Comment to the FCC on Internet deployment.273 FCC Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc has
267
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stated that the FCC “has to start to think hard about data” after its
decision to reclassify broadband Internet service providers as
common carriers.274 In an August 2015 Wall Street Journal commentary, FTC and FCC commissioners noted that they are “disturbed” that their respective agencies are on a “collision
course.”275
Neither the FCC nor the FTC have defined how their cooperation might take shape here. But the FTC’s 2014 comment to the
FCC may prove instructive: “as the FCC explores the laws and
standards applicable to broadband providers . . . the FTC encourages the FCC to consider the [agencies’] well-established legal
standards and best practices,” such as those outlined in the Joint
Advertising Guidelines.276 A cooperative FTC/FCC privacy enforcement regime could mirror the agencies’ approach to dialaround service enforcement. For example, the agencies could issue
joint privacy guidance documents, such as those described
above.277 Additionally, the agencies could develop a set of consistent substantive principles for enforcing privacy jointly.278 Or simi1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comment of the FTC, GN
Docket No. 14–126 at 12 (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/federal-trade-commission-comment-federalcommunications-commission-regarding-privacy-security/140919privacybroadband.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QRJ-GWTF] [hereinafter FTC Comment] (“The FTC welcomes
the opportunity to share its experience promoting consumer privacy and data security
with the FCC and looks forward to working with the FCC to ensure a consistent,
efficient, and effective approach to enforcement and oversight in the broadband area.”).
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larly, the agencies could carve out expertise-specific areas for privacy enforcement, such as the FTC and DOJ do in the antitrust
context.279
When considering co-governance as a viable option for Internet
privacy regulation, we should remember the criticisms that the
FCC’s current co-governance scheme face.280 For FCC/FTC privacy co-governance to be effective, it is important the regime
would be free from any of the problems inherent in the
FCC/DOJ’s antitrust co-governance scheme. That is, a privacy cogovernance regime should produce and rely upon clear, efficient,
predictable rules and standards. Otherwise, the same inefficiencies
that plague the FCC/DOJ antitrust co-governance regime would
render any complimentary privacy governance scheme unworkable
and ineffective.
CONCLUSION
Internet privacy is at a crossroads.281 As consumer privacy and
data security grow in interest to both consumers and regulators,
rapid and aggressive changes to regulation in these areas are taking
place. As businesses, consumers, and regulators adapt to these
changes, they will inevitably face complications and tensions. Such
is the way of progress.
But complications and tensions are less tolerable in some areas
than in others. Generally speaking, we hope that our government
functions effectively and efficiently; this is especially true when the
government’s function is to protect something as sacrosanct as
personal privacy.
In this Note, I have attempted to provide an account of one
tension that has arisen in the Internet privacy context. Though I
have offered a few potential solutions for resolving this tension, it is
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difficult to predict how resolution will occur—if it occurs at all. It
will be interesting to wait and see.

